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The history of biological warfare and intentional food contamination events reviewed and presented here act as a backdrop for a field study that examined the potential for intentional food contamination at military deployment locations. The field study involved a review of current food procurement and handling practices at several deployment locations.
The practices were examined using critical control point analysis, a procedure used by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to evaluate procurement and processing of foods used in the space program.
BACKGROUND ON BIOLOGICAL WARFARE:
Pre-WWII Although no attempts have been documented where food was used to poison US military forces, the threat of biological warfare (BW) has existed since plague infected corpses were hurled over castle walls in the middle ages. In North America, one of the earliest uses of BW agents in wartime was during the French and Indian Wars, when the British gave blankets contaminated with smallpox virus to the Indians with devastating effects (Christopher et al, 1997) . Later, during World War I (WWI), the Germans tried to infect Allied horses and mules with anthrax and glanders, a respiratory infection of horses and mules caused by Pseudomonas mallei (Clarke, 1968) . This incident, along with the widespread use of chemical weapons, prompted the Polish delegation to lobby for the banning of biological weapons in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The Protocol prohibited the use of both chemical and biological weapons in battle but failed to limit their development, testing and stockpiling (Cookson et al, 1969) . The United States, at the urging of the Chief of the Army's Chemical Warfare Service, did not ratify the Geneva Protocol. Non-ratification had serious and unexpected effects on world events. The US reluctance to ratify the protocol spurred both Japan and Russia to launch extensive biological warfare research programs (Spiers, 1986) . World powers saw US hesitation as an indication that this must be a valuable weapon in need of further study.
WWII
During World War II (WWII), both the Axis and Allied powers participated in biological weapons research. Although the US never amassed large stockpiles of biological weapons, research was conducted on the use of both anthrax and botulism toxin (Bernstein, 1987) . Following that research, a BW production plant was constructed in Terre Haute, Indiana, however, weaponry production was never started (Mobley, 1995) .
The British participated in the testing of BW agents on the Gruinard Islands, off the coast of Scotland. The testing was accomplished using bombs loaded with anthrax against sheep placed on the island during 1942 and 1943 (Harris et al, 1982) . The experiment was a great success and the islands were left totally uninhabitable for over 45 years (Aldhous, 1990) . The only BW weapons ever known to be manufactured and stored for use by the British were anthrax-laced cattle feed pellets. The pellets were intended for use against various livestock species in Germany but were never used (Bernstein, 1987) .
Though both Axis and Allied powers participated in testing of biological agents during WWII, Japan was the only country to employ them. Japan's BW program that attempted to exploit various agents, including anthrax, plague, and syphilis (Cowdrey, 1984) also used Chinese prisoners as test subjects (Harris, 1994) . The Japanese used biological warfare against the Chinese civilian population using food as "bait" to draw victims to the source of the contamination. Planes were used to drop rice and wheat, containing plague infected fleas, over villages on October 4, 1940 (Harris, 1982 . Chocolate candies laced with anthrax were given to Chinese children with deadly effects in July 1942 (Cowdrey, 1984) .
Korea
The Korean War, unlike WWI and WWH, had no substantiated reports of BW agents.
The lack of development and use, however, did not prevent the Korean and Chinese government from making claims about their use for political gain. Both governments claimed that US aircraft had released disease-carrying insects from the air much like the Japanese had done during WWII. The Chinese government even used these claims to start a public health campaign focusing on improved hygiene practices among the Chinese population. No credible evidence of BW agent use by the US was ever produced (Mobley, 1995) .
The Cold War and Vietnam Era
Research on the use and effects of biological weapons continued during the Cold War as well. Organizations at Fort Detrick conducted extensive animal testing (Press, 1985) while other American scientists conducted human tests. During September 1950, several tests were accomplished, using unwitting US citizens, by the release of bacteria from ships in San Francisco Bay. Serratia marcescens and Bacillus globigii, were thought to be harmless, but one death did occur along with a mild outbreak following the tests (Cole, 1988) . In the mid 1960's, Army researchers in New York City dropped light bulbs filled with Bacillus subtilis into subway ventilation shafts to assess US vulnerability to BW agent attack. The agent was quickly spread throughout the subway system, with no action by transit authorities, confirming to investigators the vulnerability of the US to intentional BW attack (Cole, 1985) .
BW agents saw only limited used during the Vietnam War. The Vietcong's most sophisticated attempts at using biological agents involved the tipping of punji stakes with feces. Although a primitive use of BW, it was effective, the wounds of those encountering these sharpened stakes quickly became infected, and recovery was prolonged (Mobley, 1995) .
There were reports during the Vietnam War era of thousands of deaths among both villagers and adversaries of the Soviets living in Cambodia, Laos, and Afghanistan. These deaths were apparently due to "yellow rain", a tricothecene mycotoxin reportedly used by the Soviets and their allies, causing nausea, blistering and death (REFERENCE).
During the Cold War, President Nixon saw the need to address the use of BW agents in war. He began his efforts by first destroying all US stockpiles of BW weapons and then spearheaded negotiations on the Biological Weapons Convention. The Convention drafted a treaty outlawing the use of offensive biological weapons (Press, 1985) . Though the convention was agreed upon by world powers, Soviet Block countries were believed to have continued the development of offensive BW capabilities. The Biological Weapons
Convention quickly proved outdated with the introduction of genetic engineering and the lack of treaty verification provisions (Mobley, 1995) .
After the Biological Weapons Convention, BW agents saw continued use. One of the more famous instances involved the assassinations of two Bulgarian exiles Georgi Markov and Vladimar Rostov. Both were killed with ricin-impregnated pellets fired from an umbrella (Mobley, 1995) . In 1979, the former Soviet Union suffered a pulmonary anthrax epidemic of unknown magnitude. In 1992, President Boris Yeltsin officially claimed government responsibility for the explosion of the top-secret military compound in Sverdlovsk (Kucewicz, 1984) . Prior to collapse, the USSR had the largest BW agent stockpile and production capability in the world (Holmes, 1989) .
The Gulf War
The Gulf War of 1991 again brought the threat of BW agent testing and use.
Intelligence sources and subsequent UN inspection teams confirmed the Iraqis had the ability to produce and weaponize anthrax spores for use against the coalition forces deployed to liberate Kuwait (Begley et al, 1991) . These anthrax cultures were imported from the United
States and France, while others were produced at the Al Hakam Single Cell Protein Production Plant (Zilinskas, 1997) . Iraq tested Clostridium perfringens, wheat cover rust, and five human viruses including Congo-Crimean hemorrhagic virus, Yellow Fever virus, Enterovirus 17, Rotavirus and Camelpox virus (Zilinskas, 1997) . The Iraqis also weaponized various toxins (botulism toxin, aflatoxin, ricin and tricothecenes) (Zilinskas, 1997 States occurred in The Dalles, Oregon (Torok et al, 1997) , where restaurant salad bars and creamers were intentionally contaminated with Salmonella typhimurium Type A. After careful investigation and tabulation of extensive food consumption histories from town personnel, salad bar items were implicated in all the restaurant-associated cases of disease.
The 1984 outbreak occurred in two waves: the first wave affected 88 people; 586 cases were identified in the second wave. All but 11 cases were considered primary cases from exposure to the infected food source. The remaining 11 cases were caused by exposure to a primary case. Only 48 of the reported cases did not have adequate information to implicate a specific restaurant. Overall, ten restaurants were implicated in the investigation:
two being targeted by the saboteurs during the first wave and an additional eight restaurants targeted in the second wave. 
Shigella dysenteriae Type 2
Another case of intentional contamination of food with a bacterial pathogen occurred in 1996 (Kolavic et al, 1997) . The contamination event involved clinical laboratory workers infected with Shigella dysenteriae Type 2. Because Shigella dysenteriae Type 2 is a rare organism and outbreaks are seldom seen in the general population, the uniqueness of this outbreak was immediately apparent. Prior to this outbreak, the last reported outbreak of Shigella dysenteriae Type 2 was in 1983 among Maryland medical cafeteria workers.
Following consumption of muffins and donuts anonymously placed in the break room of a Texas laboratory, 12 of 45 laboratory workers became infected with Shigella dysenteriae.
The pastries were consumed on October 29,1996 and cases reported through the evening of November 1,1996. Because of the rapid onset of symptoms, investigators were able to retrieve a sample of one of the implicated muffins left in the break room. Also, due to the uncommon nature of the organism cultured from the ill laboratory workers, the investigation lead to an inspection and accounting of in-house laboratory stock cultures. Laboratory reference cultures were found in disarray and portions of the reference samples had been removed. The bacterial organisms cultured from eight of the patients and also from the single leftover muffin were identical to those removed from the laboratory freezer. This incident underscores the ease with which cultures can be taken, grown and used to contaminate foodstuffs, if desired.
Hepatitis A
Another instance of apparent intentional contamination of food with Hepatitis A was documented in 1965. Twenty-three cases of hepatitis were reported among personnel (one enlisted man and 22 officers) at a Naval Air Station in November of 1961 (Joseph, 1965) .
Eighteen of the men became ill while still stationed at the Naval Air Station, three of the men became ill while on sea duty, one while on leave and one on temporary duty. The course of the disease among those infected was moderately severe with no deaths. All the patients returned to work an average of 48 days after onset of symptoms. The meticulous nature of military records greatly facilitated the investigation of this outbreak. The cases were typical of "infectious" hepatitis; the onset of symptoms was rapid, beginning with fever, followed in four to five days by dark urine, and later by jaundice. Other symptoms included general malaise, nausea, weakness, loss of appetite, chills, and myalgia, vomiting, headache, abdominal discomfort, and hepatic enlargement. does not mention urine as a means of transmission of Hepatitis A, it does say that "sanitary disposal of feces, urine and blood" from infected patients is recommended (Benenson, 1995) .
Ascaris
The last instance of intentional contamination involved four college students who were unknowingly exposed to a massive dose of embryonated Ascaris suum eggs while attending a Winter Carnival in Canada during February 1970, (Phillis, 1972) . Following an incubation period of approximately two weeks, the students presented at the Emergency Department of their local hospital, exhibiting lower respiratory tract symptoms ranging from mild dyspnea to acute respiratory failure.
The chest radiographs from all four patients revealed lung involvement ranging from mild nodular densities to marked pulmonary infiltrates. Elevated eosinophil counts were seen in some of the patients at admission and became more marked as the disease progressed.
The diagnoses of Ascaris infection were made in a variety of ways: larvae were demonstrated in sputum and gastric washings of two of the patients; immature worms were found in the feces of another; and finally, IgM antibodies to A. suum antigen detected using agar-gel diffusion and immunoelectrophoretic techniques. All but one of the patients was treated symptomatically with steroids for the pulmonary inflammation and all were given piperazine prior to the expected adult stage, killing the parasites.
No additional information was available on the method or motive for this cluster of infections, but it is a highly unusual occurrence in this setting. The most likely source of infection was a meal served to the students during a Winter Carnival. Another organization, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has historically maintained an exclusive food safety program designed to deliver a safe and nutritious food supply for space flight (Heidelbaugh et al, 1971) . A systematic approach for determining contamination potential, using the Critical Control Point technique, has been used by NASA to ensure the safety of food served in space. In the technique. Critical Control Points (CCP) are identified throughout the process of procurement, processing and delivery of food into space. CCPs are defined as a locus in the food processing where there exists a measurable attribute that has a significant influence on the quality or wholesomeness of the final product. Once a CCP was identified by NASA, the products were tested, at that point, for either acceptance or rejection. Acceptance or rejection was based upon a group of test procedures and a testing plan developed for each CCP (Heidelbaugh et al, JAVMA, 1973) .
While the space program has much greater constraints to work under, many of the principles could, as suggested by NASA food technologists (Heidelbaugh et al, JAVMA, 1973) , be used to improve the overall safety of the US food supply. Further, because of its systematic approach to analysis of a process, or series of processes, the Critical Control Point analysis technique might serve as a benchmark for protecting our military forces against intentional food contamination. The purpose of the current study was to determine the CCP analysis techniques' usefulness in the field and the potential for intentional contamination of food at 3 deployment locations.
During a deployment to theater, the first Food and Water Vulnerability assessments to identify risk of intentional contamination of food and water by biological agents were conducted. Vulnerability assessments at each facility were directed by the Joint Task 
METHODS
Assessments were completed for food procurement and food handling and documented at each of the three facilities. Analysis of each process was completed using Critical Control Point Analysis ().
RESULTS:
Two main portions of the food supply process were identified; food procurement and food handling. Food procurement was further subdivided into contracting, source identification and transportation. Each of the subdivisions represented a critical control point for analysis. Each critical control point was then considered a vulnerability. Figure 1 shows a simplified diagram of the food procurement process in theater.
Food Procurement:
Contracting: The majority of food served in the dining facilities in theater was provided through a contract with Contractor A, a large food wholesaler and food service company. Department of Defense (DOD) contracting agents negotiated these contracts with the wholesaler. A contract was also in place to purchase food from the Defense Supply
Center Philadelphia warehouse, located within the United States. The governments of the respective countries where Base A, Base B and Base C were located provided the financial support for these contracts. Though apparently well written, the contracts provided requirements only for the logistics and legalities of food delivery but lacked attention to many pertinent food safety issues.
During the assessments several specific problems were noted with these early stages of food procurement. Contracting personnel were found to have no rejection authority for incoming food. Because there was no rejection authority, US contracting personnel occasionally had to accept foods past their expiration date or that were visually unappealing. No mechanism was in place to determine who exactly had access to foods during transport.
Food Handling:
Food handling was identified as a critical control point and was further sub-divided into the areas of storage, preparation, serving/distribution, clean-up, and personnel. Each of the sub-divisions is a step in the process of delivering the food from procurement to the military dining table. The steps in food handling are shown in Figure 2 .
Storage: Storage involved keeping small to medium quantities of food at the base for later use. Generally, food to prepare ( ) days of meals was kept on the base. Additionally meals ready to eat (MREs) for ( ) days were also maintained in storage away from the dining facilities. Storage areas included wooden-floored temper tents, hard sided-temporary buildings, refrigeration and freezer units.
Some storage areas were normally found unlocked and readily accessible to anyone in the general area. At other storage areas, Services personnel did not have access -only the TCNs had keys to locks in place. TCNs entering storage areas were no always supervised.
Preparation: Preparation involved handling, mixing, and cooking foodstuffs before serving to personnel. Preparation of food was accomplished in wooden-floored temper tents and hard-sided temporary buildings. Mixing kettles, cutting boards, soft ice cream machines, ovens, stoves, and standard utensils were used to prepare foods. Personnel preparing foods were only periodically monitored by Services personnel.
Serving/Distribution: Serving/distribution included putting food onto the serving line, placing food into boxes for boxed lunches or placing food on trays for transport to more remote eating locations. Most food at the bases studied was served from a steam table directly onto stainless steel trays. Self-serve salad bars, soft drink machines, toasters and soft ice cream machines were also in place.
Clean-Up: Clean-up included the washing of trays, pans, preparation and eating areas. Personnel performing clean-up were only periodically monitored by Services personnel.
Personnel Selection: Personnel selection includes the selection and maintenance of personnel employed to help store, prepare, or serve food or clean-up food use areas. Service personnel were generally not used for any portion of the food handling process but, instead were used as supervisors and quality control inspectors. Usually only one or two Services personnel were on duty at any time in each dining facility. At well-monitored sites, the ratio of Services personnel to TCNs was about one to five. At other sites the assessment revealed ratios as high as one to twenty-five. It was also learned that TCNs working in commercial (Army Air Force Exchange System) facilities on bases were not routinely monitored at all.
Personnel from Services cycled through the facilities on a regular basis but did not continuously observe TCN actions in the dining facilities. Personnel performing the actual food handling in the deployment location were predominantly Third Country Nationals (TCNs), brought to the deployment location from surrounding countries. The TCN home nations were generally allied with United States interests. TCNs were housed in their own tent cities outside the main base areas where US troops were housed. In general, the TCN living conditions were unsanitary and far below United States poverty housing. Living areas had no interior running water, most water was drawn from common wells, TCNs were housed with several individuals per room, and no utilities or electricity was the norm.
DISCUSSION:
Contracting: With the arrival of the first deployment teams to the deployed location, contracts were let and food procurement began. The most pressing problem found was the lack of rejection authority afforded military food inspectors. Though the lack of inspection/rejection authority has been a common problem through the history of food procurement ( ), the deployment locations studied presented a slightly different situation. In the past, those responsible for procuring food for US forces were US military personnel who
were not seeking a profit by providing food to troops. The primary responsibility of the military food Services personnel was to serve good, wholesome food to their fellow service members. In the case of Contractor A, they were providing much of the food and were solely responsible for food procurement, while simultaneously trying to make a profit. The need for profit apparently caused the contractor to use foods that were past their expiration date and of questionable quality, possibly compromising food safety. To protect against intentional contamination, contracts must contain rejection authority and training of contract personnel about associated procurement issues must be accomplished.
Source Identification: Other problems identified by the assessment teams were the lack of contractual requirements that food be from military inspected and approved sources only; and the lack of inspection authority for facilities contracted for meal preparation.
Again, these problems are nothing new ( ) but demonstrate a lack of vigilance on the part of the US military in protecting itself against intentional food contamination. Food processing plant inspections should be completed and approved before contracts are written.
Because during the vulnerability assessments questionable growers and suppliers of food were identified; care in selecting suppliers must be taken during the contracting phase of food procurement, as well as continued monitoring of contract compliance to ensure that food sources are considered safe. Receipt inspections must be accomplished to ensure the contractor is not using food from unapproved sources. Receipt inspections increase suppliers' awareness that the food is being inspected for intentional contamination, as well as wholesomeness. Even sporadic inspections give the perception that the food supply is being monitored. Special care must be taken during procurement not to purchase foods that have already been intentionally contaminated prior to purchase.
Transportation: Transportation of food supplies from the vendor to the actual deployed site allows a potential window for intentional contamination. To overcome this threat of intentional contamination, some "chain of custody" for the food intended for consumption by US military personnel should be maintained. At a minimum, the contracts should require some sort of "seal" protocol be in place to help eliminate or at least reduce the accessibility of the food and the potential for contamination during transportation. A seal protocol requires early thought and might require a trusted agent be placed at the point of origin to inspect/oversee the placement of a metal or plastic seal on the truck door. Seals could be numbered and could only be removed by the receiving agent. The number would be placed on the bill of lading and this would be matched with the unopened seal. A potential difficulty with the seal protocol would be driver stopping for other drop-offs and the vehicle inspections on main highways, completed by the host nation. Simple steps that reinforce good sanitation could help to prevent TCNs from contaminating foods. Showering into the base (i.e. arriving at an entry control point, removing their clothes, showering and donning clothes provided by the military and being allowed to bring nothing in from the outside) would help to eliminate the risk of TCNs bringing a contaminant onto the base. Allowing or requiring the TCNs to eat the food they prepare would help to decrease the likelihood of intentional contamination and prevent the current practice of TCNs being allowed to bring in their own meals. Carrying their own meals offers them an opportunity to bring contaminants onto base to contaminate food supplies.
The first critical control point to be considered when forced to use TCN labor is the contracting document that defines their conditions of employment. Contracting agents should be well informed about food safety issues as they relate to the risk involved in using foreign national laborers and the specific contract language that should be used to help ensure the safest possible situation. Though both Services and medical personnel often support contracting officers, the level of experience varies widely from contingency to contingency.
The most sensible approach to solving this problem is a systematic, well planned approach that incorporates the knowledge of the most experienced personnel from the three disciplines;
contracting, Services and the medical community. Standardized contract wording could be developed and then taught at each of the three technical schools to new and existing personnel and included in all contracting deployment packages.
While contracting plays an important role in the initial phase of procuring the TCN labor force, once a good contract is written, only half the work is done. The day-to-day monitoring of TCNs is mostly left to Services. Simply telling Services personnel to "watch" these people (TCNs) is wholly inadequate. Services personnel, like their contracting counterparts require additional training, this training should help them to understand how to be good observers and should increase their index of suspicion for intentional contamination.
The training should also be incorporated into technical training and refresher courses at the military Services schools.
Dining Facility Use: Currently, military leaders feel compelled to provide hot meals, often increasing the risk of foodbome illness and intentional contamination in an attempt to maintain morale. This puts the issues of force protection and morale at conflict. The question is, are these meals really necessary? Do the troops really need freshly prepared meals each day, including high-risk foods such as fresh eggs for breakfast and salad at other meals. Quality of life for military members already forced to be away from their homes and families, is an issue of great importance. The risks and potential repercussions of having an entire base disabled by intentionally contaminated foods are equally important. Rations such as tray packs or MRE are a viable, if less palatable option, than hot meals served at a dining facility.
Deployment Surveillance: Lessons learned from each deployment should be well documented and attempts made to incorporate these lessons into field guidance should be taken seriously. Conducting business continually in the same manner without incorporating new information from each deployment is a luxury we cannot afford when it comes to intentional contamination of foods. With lives at stake, those lessons will be costly to learn and devastating to repeat.
Though every attempt must be made to prevent intentional food contamination, we must be prepared for the possibility that it could occur. Deployment surveillance is the responsibility of the Theater Medical Surveillance Team in the SWA AOR. They collect and compile weekly disease surveillance reports for all sites in SWA, looking for disease trends and especially increased rates of disease that could be due to biological warfare. Early detection is vital, and work is now underway to make this a real-time reporting system so that disease trends can be evaluated continuously. This next step is important to attain due to the time sensitive nature of the information. The ability to identify and respond quickly and correctly to instances of intentional contamination is nearly as important preventing their occurrence.
SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS:
In the days since the chemical attack on the Tokyo subway system and the bombings of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center in New York, the threat of Biological Warfare has been taken more seriously by leaders in the US. An entire issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association (August 6, 1997) was recently dedicated to biological warfare. Danzig et al, (1997) contends that as a country we must realize that nations are not the only participants in terrorist activities. Simon (1997), points out that organizations/individuals must accept the reality that we will not be able to prevent every act of BW terrorism. Additionally, only by planning and investing in the right training and defensive measures can we diminish the likelihood that biological weapons will be used and reduce the risk, disruption, and casualties in the event that such weapons are used (Danzig, 1996) .
The professional literature as well as world news coverage indicate that biological warfare may be employed and food could potentially be used as a weapon of that biological warfare. Numerous food supply vulnerabilities to the threat of contamination at three deployment locations were identified using the Critical Control Point technique and a very limited amount of time and resources. Many of the vulnerabilities identified were easily correctable, again, involving a minimum of monetary resources and time. Others, such as contract modification, would require additional effort to bring to fruition. This study shows, that HACCP analysis can be used to identify process in food procurement and food handling
